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TAXATION

JACK S. LEVIN*

STEPHEN S. BOWEN**

During the past term, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit decided six cases under the Internal Revenue Code,I including three
income tax cases, one estate tax case and two cases dealing generally with
questions of tax procedure. The income and estate tax cases were on appeal
from the Tax Court and the two procedure cases were on appeal from federal
district courts. In finding for the federal government, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed all six of the decisions below.
THE INCOME TAX DECISIONS

In Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner,2 the Seventh Circuit held that
an accrual basis taxpayer's delivery of its secured, interest-bearing, demand
promissory note to a qualified employees' profit sharing trust did not
3
constitute "payment" within the meaning of section 404(a)(6) of the Code.
During the taxable year in question, Williams accrued a liability to contribute
to a qualified profit sharing plan and delivered its note in payment of the
contribution after the end of the taxable year but before its return for that year
was due. The note was guaranteed by Williams' officers and was secured by
adequate collateral. Williams viewed delivery of the secured, demand note as
payment of the liability and deducted the profit sharing contribution in the
taxable year of accrual under section 404(a)(6) of the Code.
Section 404 of the Code generally provides that profit sharing contributions are deductible in the taxable year when paid. 4 However, at the time this
* Partner, Kirkland & Ellis; Chairman, since 1968, of A.B.A. Section of Tax Subcommittee on Taxation of Corporate Distributions; formerly Assistant to the Solicitor General of the
United States for Tax Matters, 1965-1967. Member of the Illinois Bar; LL.B. Harvard Law
School.
** Associate, Kirkland & Ellis; Member of the Illinois Bar; J.D. University of Chicago.
1. Hereinafter referred to in the text as the Code.
2. 527 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1975), aff'g 62 T.C. 166 (1974), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 2622 (1976)
(No. 75-1312).
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 404(a)(6) (amended 1974) reads as follows:
(6)Taxpayers on accrual basis.-For purposes of paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), a
taxpayer on the accrual basis shall be deemed to have made a payment on the last day
of the year of accrual if the payment is made on account of such taxable year and is
made not later than the time prescribed by law for filing the return for such taxable year
(including extensions thereof).
4. Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-1(c), T.D. 6203, 1956-2 C.B. 257.
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case arose,5 under section 404(a)(6) of the Code, if an accrual basis taxpayer
accrued such a liability in a given taxable year, payment of such contributions
was deemed to have been made on the last day of such year if payment was
made after year-end but before the return for the year was due. 6 In deciding
that delivery of a note was not payment for purposes of section 404(a)(6) of
the Code and hence, that Williams was not entitled to the claimed deduction,
the Seventh Circuit relied principally on the applicable Treasury Regulations,
the legislative history relating to section 404 of the Code, and a series of cases
dealing with the meaning of the term "payment" for cash basis taxpayers.
Section 1.404(a)- 1 (c) of the Treasury Regulations provides, in pertinent
part, that "[section 404(a)(6) of the Code]is intended to permit a taxpayer on
the accrual method to deduct such contribution or compensation in the year of
accrual, provided payment is actually made not later than [when the return is
due] .

.

.

. "7 Similarly, Senate Finance Commitee Report Number 1622 on

the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 stated that: "[u]nder present law a
taxpayer on the accrual basis is deemed to have made a contribution to an
employee plan in the year of accrual provided he actually makes payment
within 60 days after the close of that year." 8 In light of these authorities, the
Seventh Circuit interpreted "the emphasis on 'actually paid' to connote a
liquid form of payment and not a promissory note which is in substance only
9
another form of an obligation to pay. "
The Seventh Circuit, in holding that actual payment means payment in
cash, stated that it saw "no difference in the way the statute and regulation
treat the accrual .

.

.

and cash basis taxpayers for purposes of what

constitutes 'payment' except that the accrual taxpayer may make 'payment'
during the grace period"' 0 provided in section 404(a)(6) of the Code.
Consequently, the court was "unable to justify accepting payment in the form
5. As a result of the Employees Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §
1082(c)(10)(1974), section 404(a)(6) of the Code now gives both cash and accrual taxpayers the
same grace period in which to make "payment" of their contributions to employee plans. I.R.C. §
404(a)(6) reads as follows:
(6) Time when contributions deemed made.-For purposes of paragraphs (1), (2),
and (3), a taxpayer shall be deemed to have made a payment on the last day of the
preceding taxable year if the payment is on account of such taxable year and is made
not later than the time prescribed by law for filing the return for such taxable year
(including extensions thereof).
6. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 404(a)(6) (amended 1974) also provided that the time when the
return for such taxable year is due also includes any extensions granted. See note 3 supra.
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-l(c), T.D. 6203, 1956-2 C.B. 257 (emphasis added).
8. SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT No. 1622 ON THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF
1954, S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1954) (emphasis added).
9. 527 F.2d at 651. This interpretation is in accordance with the Tax Court's decision in
Logan Eng'r. Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 860 (1949), which interpreted "payment" under a
predecessor of section 404 of the Code as meaning "to liquidate a liability in cash." 12 T.C. at
868.
10. 527 F.2d at 650.
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of a promissory note for an accrual taxpayer when it . . .would not be
considered payment for the cash basis taxpayer.""1
In support of the proposition that delivery of a note is not payment for a
cash basis taxpayer, the Seventh Circuit relied on the United States Supreme
Court's decisions in Eckert v. Burnet12 and Helvering v. Price 3 and on its
own decision in Cleaver v. Commissioner.'4 In Eckert, the Court held that a
cash basis taxpayer did not incur a loss where he issued his own note in respect
of a corporation's obligation on which he was secondarily liable. 15 Similarly,
in Pricethe Court held that a cash basis taxpayer did not recognize a loss by
substituting a new note for an earlier one in discharge of a guaranty
obligation. 16 The Court stated, in part, that:
We think. . .[Eckert] is controlling in the instant case. As the
return was on the cash basis, there could be no deduction in the year
1932, unless the substitution of [taxpayer's] note in that year
constituted a payment in cash or its equivalent. There was no cash
payment and under the doctrine of the Eckert case the giving of the
taxpayer's own note was not the equivalent of cash to entitle the
taxpayer to the deduction.17
In response to the taxpayer's argument that the substituted note represented
payment because it was secured, the Court stated that:
[Taxpayer] urges that his note was secured, but the collateral
was not payment. It was given to secure [taxpayer's] promise to
pay, and if that promise to pay was not sufficient to warrant the
deduction until the promise was made good by actual payment, the
giving of security for performance did not transform the promise
into the payment required to constitute a deductible loss in the
taxable year.' 8
In Cleaverthe Seventh Circuit adopted the Priceanalysis and held that a cash
basis taxpayer was not entitled to a deduction for interest the payment of
which was evidenced by a promissory note. 19
Despite the contrary position of other circuits,2' the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Williams is correct for three reasons. First, the legislative history
and Treasury Regulations under section 404 of the Code speak in terms of
11. Id. at 651.
12. 283 U.S. 140 (1931).
13. 309 U.S. 409 (1940).
14. 158 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 849 (1947).
15. 283 U.S. at 141-42.
16. 309 U.S. at 413.
17. Id. at 413 (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 413-14.
19. 158 F.2d at 343-44.
20. See Wasatch Chemical Co. v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1963), vac'g and
rem 'g37 T.C. 817 (1962); Time Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1958), rem 'g 26
T.C. 1081 (1956); and Sachs v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 313 (3d Cir. 1953), rev 'g I T.C.M. (CCH)
882 (1952), all holding that delivery of a note to a qualified employees' retirement plan
constituted "payment" for purposes of section 404(a)(6) of the Code.
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"contributions actually paid" and "payment . . . actually made" respectively .2 ' This suggests that payment must be in cash or its equivalent and that
the mere delivery of a note to evidence the taxpayer's obligation does not
suffice. Second, numerous cases hold that a cash basis taxpayer's delivery of
a note does not constitute payment. 22 This also buttresses the court's view that
actual payment means payment in cash or its equivalent. Third, section
404(a)(6) of the Code would serve no purpose if, as Williams contended,
delivery of a note were sufficient.
Generally, an accrual basis taxpayer may accrue and deduct an expense
in the taxable year in which all events have occurred to establish the fact of
liability and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy. 23 Since the Tax Court found that Williams did, indeed, accrue a liability
24
to make the profit sharing contribution in the taxable year in question,
Williams clearly would have been entitled to the claimed deduction if section
404 were not in the Code. Under section 404 of the Code, on the other hand,
an accrual basis taxpayer must both accrue and pay such a liability in order to
obtain a deduction. If, however, section 404(a)(6) of the Code is construed to
permit payment by note, then as applied to accrual basis taxpayers, section
404 of the Code seems wholly superfluous. This is because the presence of a
note adds nothing to the accrual basis taxpayer's fixed liability or obligation to
pay, which must exist in the first place in order to accrue and deduct an
expense. If delivering a note would suffice, why would an accrual basis
taxpayer be required to make payment and be given a grace period in which
payment could be made?
In the Seventh Circuit's view, the purpose of section 404(a)(6) of the
Code was to place cash and accrual basis taxpayers on an equal footing when
deducting employee plan contributions. It is difficult to imagine that section
404(a)(6) of the Code could have any other purpose.
The second income tax case which the Seventh Circuit decided this term
was Quinn v. Commissioner.25 In Quinn the most interesting of the several
issues involved was whether Howard Quinn was taxable on $553,166
received as advanced rent.2 6 Howard and Charlotte Quinn were directors of
21. See notes 7 and 8 and accompanying text supra.
22. E.g., Helvering v. Price, 309 U.S. 409 (1940); Baltimore Dairy Lunch, Inc. v. United
States, 231 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1956); Quinn v. Commissioner, Ill F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1940).
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2), T.D. 6282, 1958-1 C.B. 228.
24. 62 T.C. at 167.

25. 524 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1975), aff'g 62 T.C. 223 (1974).
26. The only other issue of importance in the case was whether the Commissioner was
estopped from asserting the claim of right doctrine because of his prior acquiescence in other
decided cases, such as Clark v. Commissioner, I1 T.C. 672 (1948), and Gaddy v. Commissioner,
38 T.C. 943 (1962), rem 'g 344 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1965), upholding the contention of the taxpayer in
Quinn. The Seventh Circuit held that the Commissioner was not estopped and relied on the
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the Beverly Savings and Loan Association and Howard, through a trust,
owned Beverly's office building. On April 3, 1963, Howard caused Beverly
to prepay $553,166 of rent. Two days later Beverly's Board of Directors, at a
special meeting, adopted a resolution requiring return of the funds and
Howard actually repaid $53,166 on April 22, 1963. In July 1963 he gave
Beverly his secured note for $500,000 but never made any further payments. 27 In his 1963 federal income tax return, Howard did not report any
taxable income from this transaction and took the position on his return that
his $500,000 net proceeds in 1963 were a loan from Beverly. The Commissioner contended that it was taxable income received under a claim of right.
The United States Supreme Court established the claim of right doctrine
in North American Oil v. Burne?8 when it held that:
If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and without
restriction as to its disposition, he has received income which he is
required to return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not
entitled to retain the money, and even though he may still be
adjudged liable to restore its equivalent. 29
Approximately thirty years later, in James v. United States,30 the Court
expanded its doctrine to include embezzled funds when it stated that the
essence of the doctrine was the receipt of "earnings, lawfully or unlawfully,
without the consensual recognition, express or implied, of an obligation to
31
repay and without restriction as to their disposition."
Under these decisions, the critical fact in Quinn was that Howard did not
recognize an obligation to repay at the time that he received the money.
Instead, he apparently recognized for the first time his obligation to repay at
the directors' special meeting two days after he received the money. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit held that Howard had taxable income when he
received the $553,166 "without consensual recognition. . . of an obligation
to repay. "32 The court also held that Howard, a cash basis taxpayer, would be
United States Supreme Court's decision in Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965), that an
erroneous decision of the Commissioner cannot in and of itself bar the United States from
collecting a tax that is lawfully due. 381 U.S. at 73. The Seventh Circuit noted there was no
showing that the taxpayer had actually relied on the Commissioner's acquiescences. 524 F.2d at
623. An unresolved issue is whether the Commissioner would have been estopped if there had
been reliance. Id. Cf. International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914 (Ct.
Cl. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028 (1966) (Internal Revenue Service's refusal to limit
prospectively its ruling was under the circumstances an abuse of discretion).
27. Howard was later indicted and convicted of fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 657 (1970) as a
result of these transactions. United States v. Quinn, 398 F.2d 298 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
983 (1968).
28. 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
29. 286 U.S. at 424.
30. 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
31. 366 U.S. at 219.
32. 524 F.2d at 623.
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entitled to an offsetting deduction when he actually made repayment." As the
court stated:
A cash basis taxpayer's giving of his own note is not sufficient to
support a deduction in the year given; it will only support a
deduction in the year in which the note is paid . . . . Thus,
recognition of the obligation to repay funds received under a claim
of right has no tax consequences regardless of whether
it occurs in
4
the year the funds were received or a later year.
Accordingly, Howard was given an offsetting deduction for the $53,166
actually repaid but not for the $500,000 note.
In deciding Quinn, the Seventh Circuit created another conflict in the
35
circuits by rejecting the Ninth Circuit's decision in UnitedStates v. Merrill.
There, a taxpayer received executor's fees to which he was not entitled
amounting to $2,500 in 1939 and $7,500 in 1940. Before December 31,
1940, he discovered the error and entered on his books an obligation to repay
the $10,000. He actually repaid this sum in 1943. The Ninth Circuit held: (1)
that the $2,500 was received under a claim of right and was taxable in 1939;
and (2) that the $7,500 received in 1940 was not taxable because the taxpayer
recognized the obligation to repay it before the end of the taxable year in
which it was received. 36 In the Seventh Circuit's view, "Merrill was
incorrectly decided. We therefore hold that the Merrillexception to the claim
of right doctrine should not be applied in this circuit."- 37 Thus, the Quinn
decision creates a conflict between the Seventh Circuit, on the one hand, and
38
the Ninth Circuit, on the other.
In light of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Williams that under section
404 of the Code cash and accrual basis taxpayers are to be treated identically,
it is appropriate to indicate here that the claim of right doctrine discriminates
in favor of accrual basis taxpayers. As previously indicated, 39 Howard was
given a deduction for the $53,166 actually repaid and would be able to deduct
the remaining $500,000 when paid. However, an accrual basis taxpayer in
Howard's position could have accrued and deducted the entire $553,166 in
1963, regardless of when actually paid, because all events would have
occurred to establish the fact of liability and the amount thereof could have
been determined with reasonable accuracy. 4° Whether the Seventh Circuit
33. Id. at 624.
34. Id. at 625.
35.
36.
37.

211 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1954).
211 F.2d at 303-4.
524 F.2d at 624.

38. In a footnote to the Quinn decision the court acknowledged the conflict and stated that
the decision had been circulated among all judges of the Seventh Circuit and that none voted for a
rehearing en banc. Id. at 624 n.2. The Second Circuit had previously distinguished MerrillinBuff
v. Commissioner, 496 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1974).
39. See text at notes 26-27 supra.
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2), T.D. 6282, 1958-1 C.B. 228.
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fully considered how the claim of right doctrine discriminates between cash
and accrual basis taxpayers is open to question. However, it is interesting to
note that the court, in deciding Quinn, dismissed its earlier opinion in Bates
Motor Transport Lines v. Commissioner4 as "not relevant precedent because it involved an accrual basis taxpayer,
and there is no question that the
42
rules for such a taxpayer are different."
Blair v. Commissioner43 is the third income tax case which the Seventh
Circuit decided this past term. There the court disallowed a charitable
contribution for the fair market value of real estate purportedly deeded to the
University of Illinois because the court concluded that under Illinois law the
taxpayer never owned the real estate.44 Blair purchased the lot in question at a
tax sale for approximately $600. At the time of his purchase, the lot was
subject to a pending condemnation proceeding by the University of Illinois.
Blair was to receive a deed to the property if there was no redemption by the
original owner during the statutory period. However, the property was
condemned before the redemption period expired and therefore Blair deeded
the property to the University of Illinois. The court found that under Illinois
law a purchaser at a tax sale does not receive merchantable title to real estate
when that real estate is condemned before the redemption period expires.4 5
Since Blair only had a lien against the condemnation proceeds for approximately $600, he could deduct only that amount as a charitable contribution. 46
THE ESTATE TAX CASE

Estate of Steffke v. Commissioner47 concerned the meaning of the term
"surviving spouse" as used in section 2056(a) of the Code.4 8 This section sets
forth the marital deduction for federal estate tax purposes. Steffke involved a
rather bizarre set of circumstances. After twenty-two years of marriage
Priscilla obtained a Mexican divorce on grounds not recognized in Wisconsin
and married Wesley Steffke. Wesley died the following year and left the bulk
of his estate to Priscilla. Following his death, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that for state inheritance tax purposes, Priscilla was not the decedent's
41. 200 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1952).
42. 524 F.2d at 624.
43. 538 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1976).
44.

Id. at 159.

45. Id. at 158.
46. Id. at 159.
47. 538 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1976).
48. I.R.C. § 2056(a) reads as follows:
(a) Allowance of marital deduction.-For purposes of the tax imposed by section
2001, the value of the taxable estate shall, except as limited by subsections (b), (c), and
(d), be determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate an amount equal to
the value of any interest in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to
his surviving spouse, but only to the extent that such interest is included in determining
the value of the gross estate.
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wife under Wisconsin law. Therefore, the property she received was taxable
at rates applicable to strangers rather than widows. The decedent's estate also
claimed on the federal estate tax return the marital deduction under section
2056 of the Code, but the Commissioner disallowed this deduction on the
ground that Priscilla was not the decedent's surviving spouse.
Since the Seventh Circuit's principal task in Stefke was to define how
the term "surviving spouse" was used in section 2056 of the Code, it held
that:
When there are conflicting judicial decisions regarding the validity
of a divorce, the decision should be followed for federal estate
taxation purposes that would be followed by the state which has
primary jurisdiction over the administration of a decedent's estate,
i.e., the jurisdiction in which the decedent was domiciled at the time
of his death.49
This decision is generally consistent with the Commissioner's rather longstanding policy of challenging only those divorce decrees which are declared
invalid by a court with jurisdiction over the parties. 50 Even though two recent
estate tax cases are in accord with Steffke, 51 the law in this area is not wholly
consistent. The Second Circuit 52 has held, and the Third Circuit 53 has agreed,
that for federal income tax purposes" [t]he subsequent declaration of invalidity [of a divorce] by a jurisdiction other than the one that decreed the divorce is
of no consequence under these provisions of the tax law." 5 4 Since the Second
and Third Circuits' decisions are generally accepted, 55 Priscilla and the
decedent probably were married for federal income tax purposes and hence,
could have filed (and possibly did file) a joint federal income tax return.
Although the wisdom of having different rules for income and estate tax
purposes might be open to question, it is difficult to fault the court's decision
for estate tax purposes. As the court noted, the operation of section 2056 of
the Code is almost totally dependent on state law.
Section 2056(e) defines when an interest in property will be considered to have passed within the meaning of the section. Each of
the ways listed is dependent on state law, e.g., by will, by intestacy,
by dower, or by joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. State
49. 538 F.2d at 735.
50. Rev. Rul. 67-442, 1967-2 C.B. 65.
51. See Estate of Goldwater v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 540 (1975), and Estate of Spaulding v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1074 (1975). The Second Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court's decision in Estate of Goldwater v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1976), thereby
agreeing with the Seventh Circuit's decision in Steffke.
52. See Borax v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965), and Wondsel v. Commissioner, 350 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1965). In Goldwater v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 540 (1975), the Second
Circuit refused to apply Borax in an estate tax situation.
53. Feinberg v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1952).
54. See Borax v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d at 670.
55. 538 F.2d at 734.
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law also determines the nature of the property interest passing
for
56
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purposes
Thus, there is logic to the Seventh Circuit's holding that the courts of the state
whose law determines the succession of the decedent's property shall also
determine his marital status. Therefore, it is curious that the court commented
near the end of the decision that "[tihe application of principles of logic,
however, has had no conspicuous place in the construction of taxation
statutes." 57
THE TAX PROCEDURE DECISIONS

58

In United States v. Scornavacco's Restaurant, Inc.," the Seventh
Circuit upheld a summons by the Internal Revenue Service for the books and
records of a restaurant business because the business was conducted by a
corporation and not by the defendant, Anthony Scornavacco, individually.
In asserting his privilege against self-incrimination, Anthony argued that the
business was not a corporation because a corporate income tax return was
not filed for the restaurant business, because restaurant income and expenses
were shown on his individual return, and because his reporting practices
governed the determination of whether the restaurant business was conducted
in corporate form or as a sole proprietorship.
Anthony relied principally upon United States v. Theodore,60 where an
Internal Revenue Service summons was enforced because a corporate return
was filed, even though no articles of incorporation had been filed as required
by applicable state law. The Seventh Circuit's short answer was that Theordore was a "one-way street" for the government because:
A sole proprietorship actually doing business through a corporation
and also holding itself out as a corporation cannot avoid corporate
tax liability by failing to file corporate tax returns. If such a result
were possible, the tax liability of any
6 corporate entity could be
terminated by failure to file returns. '
CONCLUSION

The Seventh Circuit's most important federal tax decisions during the
past term were Williams and Quinn. Each of these decisions created a conflict
in the circuits and each bears importantly on the relative positions of cash and
accrual basis taxpayers. Williams placed cash and accrual basis taxpayers on
56. 538 F.2d at 735.
57. Id. at 737.
58. This article will not discuss United States v. Interstate Tool & Eng'r Corp., 526 F.2d 59
(7th Cir. 1976), because it dealt generally with the enforceability of an Internal Revenue Service
summons and reached predictable decisions amply supported by the record.
59. 528 F.2d 19 (7th Cir. 1976).
60. 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973).
61. 528 F.2d at 24.
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an equal footing for purposes of deducting employee plan contributions,
whereas Quinn preserved the different treatment accorded cash and accrual
basis taxpayers under the claim of right doctrine. Given these seemingly
illogical results, it is ironic that in Steffke the court admonished that logic
holds "no conspicuous place in the construction of taxation statutes."
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